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Brexit, Trade Agreements, and CAP Reform 
Alan Swinbank 
The European Union’s common agricultural policy (CAP) has changed 
considerably over the past 25 years, starting with the MacSharry reforms of 
1992 which began decoupling farm support from production and facilitated 
completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) negotiations in 1994. But two aspects of the old CAP persist. First, a major 
focus of policy remains that of supporting farm incomes. Some would argue that 
this is still the CAP’s raison d’être, despite heightened concerns about 
environmental protection and enhancement, rural development, and the role a 
multifunctional agriculture can play (Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2016). 
 Second, despite successive ‘reforms’ of the CAP’s domestic support 
provisions, import tariffs on agricultural commodities (and associated food and 
drink products) are essentially those that were determined by the rather modest 
tariff reductions achieved in the Uruguay Round. From this perspective, CAP 
reform is incomplete. Some of these tariffs are extremely high, often 
prohibitively so: on dairy products, beef, and sugar in particular. The EU’s high 
tariffs make access to its protected market extremely difficult (see Box 1). These 
high tariffs also make negotiation of Free Trade Area (FTA) agreements with 
other countries around the world more complicated than they might otherwise 
be, including any FTA with the United Kingdom following the latter’s imminent 
withdrawal from the EU (‘Brexit’). 
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Box 1: Preferential access to protected markets  
Two basic principles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are: i) that its 
members should negotiate and then fix (‘bind’) the maximum tax (tariff/duty) 
that they are entitled to charge on imports from other WTO members  —their 
‘bound’ tariffs— and ii) that these (or any lower applied tariffs) should be levied 
on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) basis to all WTO members. But there are a 
number of ways that the EU offers preferential access to its protected market, all 
of which might be emulated by a post-Brexit UK. 
Customs unions and free trade areas (FTAs) 
WTO rules allow groups of countries to form customs unions (of which the EU is 
a particular exemplar) or FTAs, within which products can move freely. For FTAs 
this only applies to ‘originating products’, necessitating rules of origin 
ascertaining that the product was produced within the FTA by determining the 
minimum level of processing required. Although agreements are supposed to 
cover substantially all the trade between the constituent parties, agricultural 
products are often excluded. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada for example will exclude poultry. 
The EU is a major supplier of agri-food imports into the UK, and how this duty-
free trade will be maintained, or replaced, following Brexit is as yet unknown.  
With regard to the FTAs the current EU has with dozens of countries around the 
world, the UK might hope to roll-over (‘grandfather’) their provisions, including 
continuing access for raw cane sugars for example from former ACP (African, 
Caribbean and Pacific) countries.  
Developing countries 
WTO rules allow for preferential access from developing countries, provided the 
importing state does not differentiate between countries at a comparable level of 
development. The EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) offers few 
concessions on agri-food trade, but its Everything but Arms (EBA) scheme 
(available to the Least-developed Countries: LDCs) allowing duty and quota free 
imports is important for a number of CAP products, for example sugar. The 
expectation is that the UK would continue to apply EBA provisions; and for 
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developing countries more generally it could choose to offer more liberal 
concessions on agri-food trade than the current EU’s GSP. 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
As discussed by Revell in this issue of EuroChoices, a TRQ grants access for a 
specified quantity of product at a lower tariff (often zero) than the MFN tariff 
charged on over-quota imports. On the conclusion of the Uruguay Round the EU 
entered into binding commitments for current access TRQs for specified 
countries (e.g. butter from New Zealand) and minimum access TRQs available on 
a MFN basis to all WTO Members (erga omnes) to enable some penetration of its 
market. Subsequent negotiations following EU enlargements and resolution of 
trade disputes have considerably expanded the list of TRQs in the EU’s WTO 
commitments. How these TRQs might be allocated between the EU27 and a post-
Brexit UK has yet to be determined. 
From time-to-time the EU has unilaterally introduced TRQs on an MFN basis to 
resolve supply difficulties (e.g. for industrial sugar), but as these do not form part 
of the EU’s commitments they can be withdrawn at any time. Some supposedly 
autonomous TRQs have nonetheless a binding nature: for example the TRQ for 
high-quality beef derived from cattle not treated with growth hormones 
introduced to resolve (at the time) the Beef Hormones dispute with the USA and 
Canada (Council of the European Union, 2012),  discussed below. In addition, 
TRQs frequently form part of a FTA agreement. For example, within CETA, duty-
free imports of cheese from the EU into Canada will be limited by TRQs. 
 
Tariff reductions have not been part of CAP reform 
One outcome of the Uruguay Round was that developed countries were expected 
to convert trade barriers (such as the EU’s variable import levies) into 
conventional tariffs—a process known as tariffication— which would then be 
reduced by 36 per cent (on average) over a transitional period, and bound. The 
EU broadly followed this formula, but in some instances went further. For 
example, the 1992 MacSharry reform reduced the support price for common 
wheat to €119.19 per tonne from 1995, and yet tariffication—based on pre-1992 
 4 
price differences—would have resulted in a prohibitively high import tariff of 
€95 per tonne. Consequently the EU agreed it would apply a lower duty to 
ensure that the duty-paid import price would not exceed 155 per cent of the EU 
support price (Swinbank, 1997). Subsequent WTO negotiations led to revised 
provisions. Whilst the Uruguay Round agreement for high quality wheat, maize, 
and sorghum remained unchanged—resulting in duty-free imports of this group 
of products in recent years—it was replaced by TRQs for medium quality wheat 
and barley, with in-quota tariffs of €12 and €16 per tonne respectively, although 
both of these in-quota tariffs have on occasion been suspended. Quantities in 
excess of these TRQs can be imported, at what the European Commission (2014: 
7) refers to as the ‘dissuasive level’ of the full MFN tariff (i.e. €95 per tonne for 
common wheat). 
 Other tariffs remain excessively high: a remnant of the pre-1992 CAP. 
Thus the MFN tariff on white sugar remains at €419 per tonne even though this 
is higher than the support price for white sugar (for triggering private storage 
aid) which currently stands at €404.4 per tonne. 
 The OECD’s PSE (Producer Support Estimate) calculations for the period 
2013-15 indicate that 19 per cent of EU farmers’ gross farm receipts were 
dependent upon transfers from consumers and taxpayers, and suggests that 24 
per cent of this took the form of market price support (OECD, 2016: 86). In the 
main, it is the EU’s high import tariffs on agricultural products that generate this 
market price support.  
It had been envisaged that following the Uruguay Round further 
negotiations in pursuit of the ‘long-term objective of substantial progressive 
reductions in support and protection’ would be pursued, and this commitment 
became part of the agenda for the Doha Round that began in 2001. A fairly 
detailed blueprint for a revised Agreement on Agriculture had been developed by 
2008 (WTO, 2008) when the tariff negotiations stalled. This 2008 text envisaged 
that the highest tariffs could be cut by as much as 70 per cent.  
 Policy-makers rarely reduce tariffs unilaterally, for understandable 
political economy reasons. Those economic actors who stand to lose from the 
policy change (e.g. farmers) are likely to be better mobilised politically than 
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those who gain, even though economists would argue that the latter could (and 
perhaps should) compensate the losers, resulting in an overall gain in economic 
welfare. Instead, trade negotiations usually proceed on the basis of reciprocal 
‘concessions’ whereby, it is argued, improved access to an overseas market is 
achieved by conceding easier access to one’s own. When the Doha Round was 
still in play—in 2008 for example—it was quite understandable that the EU 
would not unilaterally reduce its tariffs on agricultural products—even though a 
series of CAP reforms had made this feasible— because it planned to do so in the 
context of an overall package deal in which its gains in other sectors could be 
said to compensate its ‘concessions’ on agriculture. But with the Doha Round 
now more-or-less moribund, is this still an appropriate strategy? 
 
Free trade areas: but with whom? 
With multilateral trade negotiations stalled, attention had switched to bilateral 
trade liberalisation. The EU, for example, has engaged with South Korea, Japan, 
Canada, the USA and Mercosur (in South America), and plans to launch FTA 
negotiations with Australia and New Zealand. With former ACP states it has 
negotiated a series of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that include 
FTAs allowing free importation of sugar. 
 Nonetheless, the high tariffs on a number of CAP products have proved 
problematic for EU negotiators, as illustrated by the CETA negotiations 
mentioned in Box 1. Beef is a particularly sensitive issue for Europe’s cattle 
farmers. These high CAP tariffs not only complicate the EU’s negotiations with 
competitive international suppliers such as Australia and Brazil, but they are 
likely to complicate the UK’s post-Brexit trade strategy as well. 
 The UK has said that it wishes to secure ‘the freest and most frictionless 
trade possible in goods and services between the UK and the EU’; and that it ‘will 
pursue … a new strategic partnership with the EU, including an ambitious and 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement and a new customs agreement’. At the 
other end of the trading spectrum it has said that ‘no deal for the UK is better 
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than a bad deal for the UK’ (HM Government, 2017: 35 & 65). What do these 
alternative scenarios imply for the UK’s future agri-food trade policies? 
 
Trade with the Republic of Ireland 
‘When the UK leaves the EU we aim to have as seamless and frictionless a 
border as possible between Northern Ireland and Ireland, so that we can 
continue to see the trade and everyday movements we have seen up to 
now’ (HM Government, 2017: 21). 
As the House of Lords European Union Committee (2016: 18), and others (e.g. 
Matthews in this issue of EuroChoices), have noted: ‘the agricultural sector on the 
island of Ireland operates on an all-island basis’, adding: ‘Supply chains in 
particular are extremely interconnected ….’ Both the Republic of Ireland and the 
UK have indicated that they do not wish to see the reintroduction of a ‘hard 
border’—with physical checks and customs controls—following Brexit. 
Achieving this for trade in animals, agricultural commodities, and food and drink 
products, presents particular challenges. Computerised declarations for the 
payment of customs duties and determining conformity with rules of origin and 
regulatory compliance, and vehicle number-plate recognition technologies and 
the bar-coding of products, combined with the occasional spot-check, could 
probably go some way to achieving such an outcome; but the House of Lords 
European Union Committee (2016: 27) expressed scepticism: ‘The experience at 
other EU borders shows that, where a customs border exists, while the burden 
and visibility of customs checks can be minimised, they cannot be eliminated 
entirely.’  
An ‘ambitious and comprehensive Free Trade Agreement’ could be 
important. Provided the UK’s tariff barriers remain aligned with those of the EU, 
and regulatory provisions are not allowed to diverge after Brexit, then fairly lax 
rules of origin, and minimal checks on regulatory compliance, might satisfy both 
parties. The EU would probably insist on this, thus foreclosing the UK’s ambition 
to pursue ‘free trade’ in these products elsewhere in the world. Moreover, this 
‘light-touch’ would have to be applied to all UK-EU27 trade, not just that between 
the UK and Ireland. However, if regulatory provisions are allowed to diverge, or 
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the UK adopts a tariff policy that differs notably from that of EU27, then sanitary 
and phytosanitary (SPS) and customs controls might become inevitable. 
The European Commission (2010) has outlined the rigorous border 
measures applied to ensure that imports of food, feed, animals and plants from 
third countries—which is what the UK would be—meet the EU’s strict SPS 
requirements. For example: ‘Live animals and animal products can only enter the 
EU through approved border inspection posts (BIPs) under strictly harmonised 
import conditions. These require that such imports are sourced from approved 
third countries, from approved or registered establishments and that the 
veterinary certificates accompanying the consignments must be signed by the 
competent authority of the exporting country providing detailed information as 
to the public and animal health status of the products and their conformity with 
the EU’s import requirements’ (p. 6).  
 The tariff issue is particularly challenging for dairy products, meats and 
sugar. Ireland exports beef and dairy products to the UK, but it is no longer a 
sugar producer and imports its requirements. Suppose the UK and EU27 do seek 
to conclude an ambitious and comprehensive FTA that includes agriculture, but 
that the UK also indicates that, post-Brexit, it would wish to pursue a more 
liberal import policy with regard to beef and sugar from other origins. Would 
EU27 be happy to accept this outcome? Irish beef producers might fear that their 
produce could be displaced from the British market by supplies from South 
America, negating in their minds the benefit of an open border. Would EU27 
sugar producers be willing to accept onto the Irish market sugar refined in the 
UK from imported raw cane sugar, without insisting on stringent rules of origin, 
or even imports of sugar produced from sugar beet grown in the UK on East 
Anglian farms? 
 If an open border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is 
to be maintained, without border controls on agri-food trade, then it is difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that: 
 Regulatory convergence must be maintained post Brexit; and 
 either: the UK would not be free to pursue ‘free-trade’ policies given 
that its tariff barriers on CAP products —including its other FTA 
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arrangements and TRQ provisions— would have to match those of 
EU27;  
 or: EU27 would need to quickly complete the reform of its CAP by 
unilaterally reducing its MFN tariff barriers to a level more compatible 
with the  UK’s trade policy aspirations towards third countries. 
 
Free (or freer) trade 
If the UK fails to conclude a comprehensive FTA with the EU27 that includes 
agriculture, thus enabling it to break free from the unreformed CAP’s tariff 
barriers, what alternative agri-food trade strategies are available? The EU27 
currently supplies much of the UK’s imports of meats and dairy products: how 
easily could those supply chains be maintained? 
Many analysts assume that on Brexit the UK will ‘inherit’ the EU’s current 
MFN tariff bindings, and in some way share its TRQ obligations, although neither 
outcome is entirely certain or problem free (issues discussed more thoroughly 
by both Matthews and Revell in this issue of EuroChoices). The UK would not be 
obliged to apply its bound tariffs: it could unilaterally reduce them, provided it 
did so on a MFN basis. A number of economists would advocate such an 
approach. The UK could not, however, levy a charge on imports from Ireland 
lower than that applied to other WTO Members, unless trade between Ireland 
(i.e. EU27) and the UK was governed by a WTO compatible FTA or customs 
union.  
Similarly, it could open TRQs larger than those it was obliged to offer as 
its ‘share’ of the EU obligation, provided it did so on a MFN basis and complied 
with the provisions of GATT Article XIII on the Non-discriminatory 
Administration of Quantitative Restrictions, but again precluding a special deal 
for EU27. Both options would leave the EU27 competing with suppliers from the 
rest of the world, UK farmers facing sharper import competition, and potentially 
lower prices trickling down into retail outlets. FTA agreements with Mercosur, 
Australia, New Zealand, etc., could significantly open up the UK’s agri-food 
markets, placing EU27 suppliers in an uncompetitive position, particularly if the 
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UK still applied its MFN bound tariffs against them. Similarly, without a UK-EU27 
FTA in place, UK firms would be in competition with other third country 
suppliers for access to TRQs for entry into a protected EU27 market, or face the 
EU27’s full MFN tariff. 
Managing existing TRQs could prove taxing, and potentially lead to future 
trade disputes. For example the US has recently complained that the autonomous 
TRQ for hormone-free beef that the EU agreed in 2012 on a MFN basis in 
settlement of the Beef Hormone dispute (as mentioned in Box 1) has not proved 
as advantageous to US producers as had been envisaged. An increasing 
proportion of this TRQ has apparently been filled by non-US suppliers and 
consequently, it is claimed, the TRQ ‘has not in practice provided benefits to the 
U.S. beef industry sufficient to compensate for the economic harm resulting from 
the EU ban’ (United States Trade Representative, 2016). Accordingly the US is 
considering whether trade sanctions against the EU should be re-imposed. If this 
had happened in a post-Brexit world, from whom (EU27, UK) would the US be 
seeking redress?  
 
But Brexit is unlikely to result in CAP reform 
Although critical of the CAP, the UK has not been particularly successful at 
prompting reform. In 2005 its 15-year vision was for an industry that would, 
inter alia, be ‘internationally competitive without reliance on subsidy or 
protection’ (HM Treasury & Defra, 2005: 9). Despite this rhetoric, the CAP’s 
protective tariffs of 2017 remain essentially as negotiated in the mid-1990s. 
Whether a different trajectory for the CAP would have influenced the British 
electorate on 23 June 2016 seems doubtful. Vote Leave (2016: 13), however, had 
thought it relevant to comment: ‘Some things we have tried to change for 
decades are still there, such as the Common Agricultural Policy that increases 
food bills and damages African agriculture.’ The EU’s failure to complete the 
reform of its CAP, leaving some excessively high import tariffs in place, is a 
complicating factor in designing and implementing post-Brexit trade 
arrangements that will not be problematic for Ireland—the EU member state 
most dependent on agri-food exports to the UK. As an EU member state the UK 
 10 
singularly failed to secure its Vision for a CAP without reliance on subsidy or 
protection; but equally it seems highly unlikely that the challenges posed by 
Brexit might prompt the EU to unilaterally reduce its excessively high CAP tariffs. 
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Summary  
Although a number of reforms have significantly changed the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the past two decades, a defining characteristic of 
the policy is its prohibitively high import tariffs on a number of key commodities 
as tariff cuts have not formed part of CAP reform. These high tariffs, whilst 
protecting EU producers, complicate the EU’s attempts to negotiate Free Trade 
Area (FTA) agreements around the world, and will likewise be problematic for 
agri-food trade with a post-Brexit UK, particularly over the politically sensitive 
border between EU27 and the UK on the island of Ireland. An open border could 
be more easily secured if the UK’s tariff barriers on CAP products matched those 
of EU27. This, however, implies either that the UK will have to abandon its plans 
to pursue ‘free-trade’ policies with other countries around the world, or that 
EU27 needs to complete its reform of the CAP by unilaterally reducing its tariff 
barriers. It seems highly unlikely that the challenges posed by Brexit would 
prompt the EU to unilaterally reduce its excessively high CAP tariffs. 
 
 
Pullquote 
“The CAP’s protective tariffs of 2017 remain essentially as negotiated in the mid-
1990s” 
